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E d m u n d H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations p r o v i d e s the 
f ramework which gu ides this presenta t ion . 1 That f ramework 
revolves around the analysis of a subject 's empty intentional act 
meeting with an object in a moment of fulfillment, where fulfillment 
is the occurrence of insight or knowledge. Husser l ' s theory of 
fulfillment, al though promising a lot, does not deliver on all its 
promises . In particular, we highlight two problems which foil 
Husser l ' s attempt to account for the notion of fulfillment. From 
these problems, we show how Paul Ricoeur ' s interest in the text 
and narrative, although changing the focus of Husser l ' s analysis , 
makes possible the framework set up in the Logical Investigations. 
The first problem relates to the issue of an intersubjective grasp 
of the external world. Husser l ' s notion of fulfillment implies an 
intersubjective component but fails to account for it given his focus 
on the solitary life (Seelenleben) of the speaking subject. As means 
to free us from this limitation, we encounter Ricoeur ' s notion of 
the text. 
The second problem stems from Husser l ' s inability to del iver 
on his productive notion of fulfillment. T o show this, we must 
first explain that fulfillment can be understood from two different 
levels: static and dynamic . On the static level, Husserl explains 
that the subject 's grasp of meaning—a consciousness of ident i ty— 
is not productive since what the subject comes to know is a meaning 
already operative in the subject 's pre-reflective life. On the dynamic 
level, the subject can be said to gain a new insight into the world 
thus highlighting a productive sense of fulfillment. 
Although this productive sense of fulfillment promises to open 
the subject to new objective insights, Husser l ' s solipsism makes 
dynamic fulfillment an inoperable notion. As an answer to this 
problem, we turn to Ricoeur ' s notion of narrative and show how 
productive fulfillment can occur. 
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Before we get the analysis underway, a brief explanation is in 
order regarding my treatment of Husserl. The reader who is familiar 
with Husser l ' s corpus, especially the Cartesian Meditations,2 will 
be quick to respond that Husserl is concerned with incorporating 
into his phenomenology the very issue of intersubjectivity which 
concerns my analysis. The fifth meditation, in particular, is devoted 
to s h o w i n g h o w t h e n o t i o n of objectivity d e p e n d s u p o n 
intersubjective constitution.7, Husserl 's interest in intersubjectivity 
is an indisputable fact. What is in dispute is whether or not Husserl 
successfully overcomes the solipsism which looms over his earlier 
writings: the Logical Investigations and Ideas I.4 That these texts 
suffer from the problem of solipsism seems to be no less of a fact. 
I am not, however, interested in Husserl ' s capacity to overcome 
his own shortcomings in this paper. It is a thematic problem which 
concerns me: how a new objective insight is poss ib le /or the subject. 
Thus, if my treatment of Husserl is deemed as overly narrow let 
me state that it is for the greater good of locating an issue which I 
believe Ricoeur clearly sees and to which he provides a plausible 
answer. 
I. Solipsism and the Static Notion of Fulfillment 
Fulfillment is a term which is supposed to account for more 
than how an isolated ego grasps the object of perception. When 
fulfillment occurs the subject has an insight regarding how the 
object must be for all people. The moment of fulfillment, then, is 
correlated to a universal insight. Husser l ' s concern for a universal 
perspective, however , is immediately put into question given 1) 
his exc lus ive focus on the speaker's grasp of his o r her own 
i n t e n t i o n 5 and 2) his explanat ion that a sub jec t ' s in tent ion is 
influenced by previous experiences with the object of percept ion. 6 
The problem which follows is this: if an individual 's intentional 
grasp of an object is influenced by prior experiences with the object, 
and if the analysis never moves outside of the individual 's own 
grasp of the object, then the scope of what the individual can know 
of the object is limited by his or her real world experiences. So , 
although we can admit that the subject knows an object through 
experience, we cannot say that this level of insight is a universal 
insight regarding how the object must be for all people . 7 
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By itself, the solipsistic perspective requires us to, at least, 
build into the analysis of intentional experience an intersubjective 
perspective. Before we do this, we would like to uncover some of 
the s t ruc tura l c o m p o n e n t s and t e r m i n o l o g y wh ich m a k e up 
Husser l ' s notion of fulfillment. For Husser l ' s account points to 
the way in which the intersubjective dimension can be addressed. 
W e see this potential for advancement in Husser l ' s idea that the 
notion of fulfillment can be productive. 
The notion of fulfillment has a productive dimension to it. This 
is made plain when Husserl says that individuals can gain an 
awareness of meanings . But Husser l ' s appeal to a new awareness 
of meaning can be misleading since this productive dimension can 
be taken in two senses. Here we concentrate on the first (and 
limited) sense of productivity. It correlates to a person who through 
reflection becomes aware of meanings which are already operative 
in his or her dealings with the world. In this sense, a subject gains 
a new awareness , or, as Husserl says, a consciousness of identity. 
Only when we use the perceptual series to found a 
novel act, only when we articulate our individual 
percepts, and relate their objects to each other, does 
the uni ty of con t inu i ty ho ld ing a m o n g the se 
individual percepts—the unity of fusion through 
their coinciding intent ions—provide a grounds 
[Anhalt] for a consciousness of identity.... Our 
act of i den t i f i c a t i on is in s o b e r fact a n e w 
awareness of object ivi ty, which causes a new 
'ob jec t ' to appear to us.. . (LI, 7 9 1 ; translat ion 
modified). 
Husserl appeals to a new awareness of the object but such an 
awareness is new only for the person and not in reality. The subject 
explicitly grasps what is already in play on a pre-reflective level. 
Let us clarify this dimension of experience by applying some of 
Husser l ' s terminology to this level of insight. In particular, we 
look at the notions of static (statische) and dynamic (dynamische) 
fulfillment as based upon the empty/full paradigm (LI, 687-694) . 
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A static moment of fulfillment is described by Husserl as the 
tranquil correlation between intention and object (ein ruhendes 
Eifiilltsein, nicht ein sich Decken, sondern das in Deckung Sein 
[LI, 696]) . This level of fulfillment is best described as a subject ' s 
unreflective dealings with an object of perception, e.g., when a 
person who is looking for a particular object finds it in perception 
and says, "There is my inkpot." In such an instance, Husserl would 
say that the object of the intent ion is the focus and not the 
components which make up the intention. 
Through reflection, however, the aspects which make the act 
intentional can become the object of focus. These parts are , 
min ima l ly , the sub jec t ' s grasp of an object and the o b j e c t ' s 
presence. Husserl goes on to describe the subject 's intentional 
grasp as empty and the subject 's actual perception of the object as 
a moment of intuitive fulfillment. 
W e must pay special attention to the notion of emptiness at 
this point, for Husserl is not referring to a mere nothingness. Rather, 
the term emptiness points to the mind ' s grasp of the object which 
exceeds what is actually given in perception. So, the term emptiness 
describes the mind ' s grasp of those aspects of the object which are 
currently absent but which could be brought into view at another 
point in t ime. (Please keep this account of emptiness in mind since 
it will be contrasted with another kind of emptiness later in the 
presentat ion. 8 ) 
N o w that Husserl has us reflecting about the c o m p o n e n t s 
involved with the notion of fulfillment, he changes the terminology 
from static to dynamic fulfillment. That is, when a person stops to 
dissect the components involved with a tranquil or static moment 
of fulfil lment, the separation between intention and intui t ive 
moment is revealed. In reflection, we can say that the intention 
meets with its object as if the intention were like a moment of 
expectation which finally reaches its object (LI, 700) . Such a 
m e e t i n g is d e s c r i b e d by Husse r l as a dynamic m o m e n t of 
fulfillment. 
W e must emphasize that this separation is in thought and not 
in reality. The intentional grasp which is described by Husserl as 
an empty act, and the corresponding intuitive act which fulfills the 
emptiness, are not two separate acts but moments which make one 
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act unified. As Husserl says, "Talk about recognized objects, and 
talk about fulfilling a meaning-intention, therefore express the same 
fact, merely from differing standpoints. The former adopts the 
standpoint of the object meant, while the latter has the two acts as 
its foci of interest" (LI, 695). 
The point is that even though in reflection it is possible to 
distinguish between static and dynamic fulfillment, between the 
intentional state of being fulfilled and the condit ions which make 
this s ta te pos s ib l e , wha t we have here is j u s t t w o dif ferent 
perspect ives on the same act. So , when Husser l says that in 
reflection the subject gains an awareness of the object of thought 
versus the object of intuition, where the object of thought is likened 
to a consciousness of identity, this awareness is not productive in 
the sense of an addition. When Husserl refers to a new awareness 
of the object—a consciousness of identity—we cannot take him to 
mean new in the sense of never experienced before; rather, Husserl 
m e a n s new in the sense of b e c o m i n g re f lec t ive ly a w a r e of 
something which is already known to the subject at a deeper , more 
fundamental , level (LI, 790). 
At this level, Husser l ' s analysis of fulfillment is concerned 
with a static model of knowledge. In other words, Husser l ' s account 
is based upon a level of subjective awareness which is already 
settled, where a subject already grasps the object from previous 
e n c o u n t e r s a n d , even if the c o m p o n e n t s i n v o l v e d wi th the 
intentional act are brought into focus through reflection, nothing 
new is learned about the world which was not already a part of the 
subject 's intentional life. 
There is, however , a second reading of the notion of dynamic 
fulfillment which promises to open the subject to new insights about 
the world. It is this account which holds our attention for it promises 
to break the circle of familiarity which has taken the productive 
life out of the subject 's intentional field of awareness . 
II. Dynamic Fulfillment as Productive 
Alongside this static analysis of the subject 's grasp of meaning, 
Husserl implies that a subject can gain an insight into the world 
which is totally new. This perspective is best seen when Husserl 
refers to the limits to the human capacity to know. Husserl says, 
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Wherever a new concept is formed, we see how a 
meaning becomes realized that was previously 
unrealized.... [Meanings] are an ideally closed set 
of general objects, to which being thought or being 
expressed are al ike cont ingent . The re a re ... 
countless meanings which ... are merely possible 
ones, since they are never expressed, and since 
they can, owing to the limits of m a n ' s cognit ive 
powers , never be expressed (LI, 333). 
T w o ideas j u m p out at us in this passage. First, Husserl refers 
to the formation of a new concept which helps a person realize a 
meaning that was previously unrealized. Second, Husserl refers 
to the countless meanings which are simply inaccessible to humans 
because of the "limits of man ' s cognitive powers . " If we take this 
second claim, in light of the first, as an expression of Husser l ' s 
awarenes s of our historical l imi ta t ions , whe re m e a n i n g s are 
s o m e t i m e s c o n c e a l e d from h u m a n s b e c a u s e of the i r soc i a l -
conceptual surroundings, then we see that the notion of insight can 
be productive in a sense quite different from the static perspect ive. 
To repeat, when this second dimension of productive fulfillment 
occurs, what is brought to a subject 's attention is something which 
did not, strictly speaking, exist prior to the individual ' s reflective 
grasp. 
W e can see how this productive notion of fulfillment works 
by modifying the significance of a few of the terms used above. 
The consciousness of identity, which within the first account is a 
reflective grasp of an already operative relation, is now a separate 
act of intention which precedes the realm of intuition. Here the 
dynamic moment of fulfillment would actually occur at the point 
when an empty intentional act meets with its object for the first 
time. In light of such a reading, Husserl says, 
W e c a n r e a d i l y d o j u s t i c e to t h e o b v i o u s 
phenomenological difference between the static 
and the dynamic fulfillment.... In the dynamic 
relationship the members of the relation, and the 
act of recognition which relates them, are disjoined 
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in t ime: they unfold themselves in a tempora l 
p a t t e r n . In t he s t a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , which 
represents the lasting outcome of the temporal 
transaction, they occur in temporal and material 
coincidence. There we have a first stage of mere 
thought (of pure conception or mere signification), 
a meaning-intention wholly unsatisfied, to which 
a second state of more or less adequate fulfillment 
is added, where thoughts repose as if satisfied in 
the sight of their object, which presents itself, in 
virtue of this consciousness of unity, as what is 
thought of in this thought, what it refers to, as the 
more or less perfectly attained goal of thinking 
(LI, 695 ; boldface added). 
What is particularly intriguing about this passage is Husser l ' s 
reference to time. A transaction between, as Husserl says , a mere 
thought, i.e., a purely empty grasp, and an object actually takes 
place. In such an instance, a subject gains a moment of insight 
which is not a mere recognition, as when something which has 
already been experienced is raised to a higher (i.e., new) level of 
awareness . 9 Rather, this temporal transaction seems more like the 
experience of a scientist who creates a hypothesis regarding how 
the object of experience must he and goes out to test that hypothesis 
one step at a time. In Husser l ' s words , there are momen t s of 
intentional fulfillment which really take place in t ime and which 
are added piece by piece to the subject 's grasp through encounters 
with an object of experience. 
That is the notion of productive-dynamic fulfillment which 
concerns us. It contras ts with the former not ion of d y n a m i c 
fulfillment because the subject 's empty grasp is no longer like an 
already settled awareness of non-present perspectives of the object. 
This notion of emptiness relates to the idea that the subject is not 
sure whether or not there is, in fact, an intuition which can satisfy 
the intention. Upon this characteristic of emptiness , the notion of 
fulfillment captures the productive dimension of intentional life 
which grows through experience by actually gaining insights into 
the world which no one has grasped before. W e are intimately 
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interes ted in this d imens ion of H u s s e r l ' s not ion of dynamic 
fulfillment, where intuitive moments satisfy an intention for the 
first t ime. Unfortunately, this transaction between a purely empty 
intention and intuition has a hard, perhaps impossible, time working 
within Husser l ' s solipsistic framework. 
Although Husserl 's account contains the possibility for showing 
how this notion of dynamic fulfillment could work, he misses his 
opportunity when he pulls away from the communicative model 
into the solitary life of the speaker."' By going inward, Husserl 
limits the analysis to the contents of an individual 's intentional act 
and therefore misses the opportunity for showing how a purely 
empty intention is possible. 
W e can n o w turn to R i c o e u r ' s n o t i o n s of the text and 
narrative—both of which are based upon a communicat ive sharing 
of reference—to show how to make sense of Husser l ' s appeal to a 
purely empty i n t en t ion and , h e n c e , to s h o w h o w d y n a m i c 
fulfillment, as the occurrence of a totally new insight, can occur. 
III. Text, Narrative, and the Extension of Intention 
Let us begin with the first problem ment ioned above : the 
intersubjective dimension. Ricoeur ' s interest in the way texts 
influence an individual 's grasp of the world, while limiting the 
universalistic implications of the notion of knowledge, captures 
the sense of intersubjective insight which surrounds Husse r l ' s 
notion of knowledge ." 
Texts represent, for Ricoeur, a common bond between people. 
Since texts allow individuals to extend their scope of reference in 
the same w a y s , 1 2 the text is that intersubjective resource which 
m a k e s p o s s i b l e a c l a im to know the wor ld as o t h e r s d o . 1 3 
Admittedly, this realm of intersubjective insight is really l imited 
to those people who have actually read and understood the same 
text or texts; but, the fact remains that this level of insight is not 
ideally limited to any group of people. The notion of the text 
includes the idea that a scope of reference can be adopted by anyone 
who takes the time to engage the same material. So, even if the 
claim to know the world from within a particular/ 'w??e of reference 
is really limited to certain people, this claim to know is, in principle, 
available to anyone who can access the meaning of the text. 
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A s a m e a n s for a d d r e s s i n g the q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g an 
intersubjective grasp of the external world, Ricoeur ' s interest in 
the text puts us on track. However , the issue of fulfillment is not 
addressed at this level. We are only told how an individual ' s grasp 
of the world can be extended in the same way as other individuals. 
It is R icoeur ' s notion of narrative, as an extension of his concern 
for the text, which shows how fulfillment is possible. 
Let us first draw attention to the fact that narratives are written 
accounts about what people do. Narrat ives are , therefore , an 
intersubjective resource depicting how people act within the world. 
When a person reads the narrative of another person, e.g., a narrative 
which depicts a different or unfamiliar way of acting, the reader is 
given references about the world which increase his or her grasp of 
the world. This increase in the subject 's scope of reference is not, 
however , a full blown knowledge given that what the subject now 
understands about the world is a hypothetical rendering of the world 
for the reader. Ricoeur calls this the as / /d imens ion of the reader ' s 
experience with textual references (IT, 3 4 - 3 7 ) . w Yet, we must not 
see this lack as negative. The lack is positive since new moments 
of fulfillment are made possible for the individual through the 
accounts of others. N o w we can show how the notion of fulfillment 
relates to this intersubjective-narrative framework. 
By focusing on how some narratives are related to what people 
really do the issue of fulfillment is transformed from Husser l ' s 
interest in perception to a concern for ac t ion . 1 5 Narrat ives are to 
be unders tood as accounts which are handed d o w n through a 
linguistic community which prescribe in advance how the real world 
is to be acted upon by individuals who adopt the narrative. A 
narrative is not, then, simply a story. A narrative is an account of 
how discrete actions link together as means to accomplish a goal . 
It is the actual accomplishment of the goal which reveals how a 
narrative can be fulfilled in reality. The fact that things can really 
be accomplished by following the dictates of the narrative shows 
that the narrative is correlated to reality. (We can, for example , 
distinguish between science fiction and real science by knowing 
what can and cannot really be accomplished by people.) N o w , 
before we explain how this notion of narrative al lows us to account 
for a productive-dynamic moment of fulfillment, let us see how it 
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also adds an important intersubjective layer to the issue of static 
fulfillment. 
Husserl is capable of explaining how static fulfillment is 
possible only from a solipsistic perspective: a subject anticipates a 
m o m e n t of fulfillment because the individual has p rev ious ly 
experienced the object. Ricoeur ' s notion of narrative ad.ds another 
layer into this idea of static fulfillment: the subject, by learning a 
narrative framework, grasps how others in the field currently take 
the world to be. The subject who engages the world according to 
the structure of a narrative gains insight into an already settled 
correlation between structure and world thus coming to know the 
world as others already do. In this case, the subject certainly gains 
an ins ight into the wor ld but what the subject l ea rns is not 
necessarily something new. What is revealed to the subject is how 
the real world is already mediated by a narrative coherence . 1 6 At 
this point, we can turn to the issue of a dynamic fulfillment. 
T h e mos t impor tan t pay-off in our ana lys i s c o m e s from 
showing how Ricoeur ' s account of narrative moves beyond the 
analysis of an already settled correlation between narrative and 
action and into the dynamic notion of fulf i l lment . 1 7 Here the 
individual person raises in importance by making possible really 
new, i.e., really empty, insights into the world. Of course , the 
subject does not gain a purely empty insight into the world ex nihilo. 
Within the analysis of narrative, it is the impact other narrative 
frameworks can have over the subject 's own conception of how 
action is structured which allows the insight. Nevertheless , the 
insight is personal to the extent that a really new proposal for acting 
upon the world can come from an individual 's unique fusion of 
narratives. The dynamic notion of fulfillment is literally set into 
motion by demanding from the subject a real action to follow from 
the proposal for acting in a new way. Ricoeur says, "Read ing 
appears by turns as an interruption in the course of action and as a 
new impetus to act ion" (TN III, 179) . , x The emptiness demands 
that the subject act upon the world in order to see if, in fact, the 
narrative is f\i\fi\\ahle in the world. 
A d m i t t e d l y , R i c o e u r ' s c o n c e r n for soc i a l l y d e v e l o p e d 
narratives and the fulfillment of narratives in action changes the 
scope of Husser l ' s notion of intentionality quite drastically. 
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However , Ricoeur ' s notion of narrative retains the basic framework 
of Husserl ' s analysis and we get a better understanding of Ricoeur ' s 
account by seeing this similarity. 
Husserl is commit ted to the idea that the subject knows the 
external world as others do. Here, Ricoeur ' s notion of narrative 
helps overcome the solipsistic framework which blocks Husser l ' s 
account. Ricoeur is committed to the idea that the significance of 
a narrative is only known through a personal comprehension of 
how narrative and action unite. Here we can say that Ricoeur retains 
Husser l ' s interest in the subject and provides an answer to a very 
difficult quest ion. Husserl asks, " H o w are we to understand the 
fact that the intr insic being [an sich] of object iv i ty b e c o m e s 
'presented, ' ' apprehended ' in knowledge, and so ends up becoming 
subject ive?" (LI, 254; brackets added) By recasting the issue of 
objectivity around what is intersubjectively graspable , Ricoeur 
shows how what is objective can be apprehended by an individual 's 
intention since it is the real flesh and blood subject who is the very 
site of knowledge: the one who knows a narrative is the one who 
can put that narrative into act ion. 1 9 
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the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material 
determinations but also with value-characteristics.... These value 
characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to 
the Objects 'on hand' as Objects [konstitutiv zu den 'vorhandenen' 
Objekten als solchen], regardless of whether or not I turn to such 
characteristics and the Objects (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten 
[Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982], 53; brackets added). 
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1 6 On the notion of revelation, see Ricoeur, "Discussion: Ricoeur on 
Narrative," in On Paul Ricoeur, ed. David Wood (London/New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 180. Revelation defines a mode of knowing which 
correlates to temporal realities rather than spatial realities. Temporal 
realities include: time-periods, events, horizons, worlds, etc. These 
second-order references are not open to a strict empirical analysis as are 
first-order references. See Robert D. Sweeney, "Reference and 
Refiguration in Ricoeur's Hermeneutics," Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 62 (1988): 71-79. 
1 7 In Ricoeur's language, he is interested in showing how an individual 
can refigure action by first understanding how actions are already 
configured by narratives. See Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. I, trans. 
Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), 52-77. 
1 8 Cf. S. H. Clark, Paul Ricoeur (London/New York: Routledge, 
1990), 194. 
| l ' An earlier version of this paper was presented at the thirtieth annual 
meeting of the Husserl Circle (Seattle University). I wish to thank the 
anonymous reviewer who critiqued that submission and helped me to 
formulate a couple of the key points discussed in this paper. 
